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Comment
Vertical Territorial Restraints Before and After
Schwinn: A Clash Between Manufacturers and the
Law
From the perspective of a business firm, the antitrust laws act as
unnatural restraints upon the normal operation of the American
capitalistic system.' This is so because an essential feature of "capi-
talism" is its unplanned and decentralized method of production;
a relatively unregulated price system should dictate automatically
the answers to the fundamental business questions-what, how, and
for whom to produce and distribute.2
Perhaps no other area of antitrust concern more vividly illustrates
this clash between unfettered capitalism and the restraints of anti-
trust legislation via judicial interpretation than that of the
manufacturer-dealer relationship.3 The typical manufacturer, moti-
1. It is interesting to note that in the early stages of the development of America's capital-
ism, the government merely acted as a "protector," of the entire system and declined to
involve itself in its internal operations. Early nineteenth century economists, basing their
programs upon Adam Smith's treatises, proclaimed that the "proper role of government was
only to protect and organize the institutions of capitalism." President Madison believed that
America's infant ecomony needed protective tariffs to shield it from Europe's more sophisti-
cated practices, and that, "protected by the institutions of capitalism, individuals would be
driven by self-interest to organize and develop the productive capacity of the country" with-
out the need of governmental controls to protect them. W. CARTER & M. LENDAHL, CORPORATE
CONCENTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 4 (3d ed. 1959).
2. Ranlett & Curry, Economic Principle: The 'Monopoly,' 'Oligopoly, 'And 'Competition'
Models, in ANTITRUST AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 247 (M. Duggan ed. 1972).
3. In this context, the manufacturer-dealer relationship refers to the normal sales transac-
tion whereby a manufacturer conveys title to goods to an independent dealer who thereafter
transfers these goods to other suppliers in the vertical distributional chain or sells them
directly to the consumers or users.
The term "franchising" has often been defined broadly enough to encompass such "dealer-
sales" agreements, but that term is more properly employed to describe a continuing commer-
cial relationship wherein a franchisee is authorized to sell specific goods and/or services and
is dependent upon the franchisor for his supply of goods or for specialized services or market-
ing plans relating to their sale. Most often franchising involves the distribution of brand name
or trademarked products or services over which the franchisor has a continuing interest in
quality control and customer relations.
For further discussion on the definition of franchising as distinguished from a
manufacturer-dealer relationship see Fromson, The Distributor Agreement: Selected Legal
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vated by economically sound business practices, may desire to regu-
late the retail distribution of goods he has already sold to wholesal-
ers in order to optimize his own long-term profit margin.' The viabil-
ity of such post-sale controls, absent any form of governmental regu-
lation, would be tested in the market place by the economic "law"
of supply and demand.' That is, if the manufacturer's controls in-
creased the demand for his product in such a way as to swell his net
profits then such controls would be continued. Conversely, if the
reactive conduct of the consumers or competing firms caused the
manufacturer to lose profits, the controls upon distribution would
be abandoned. The antitrust laws,' however, add an artificial re-
straint to the free enterprise system, and consequently the distribu-
tive restrictions imposed upon wholesalers or retailers must not only
satisfy the natural demands of the marketplace, but also must com-
ply with the overriding policy of the antitrust legislation as inter-
preted by the courts.
This comment will deal specifically with the United States Su-
preme Court's treatment of post-sale territorial restraints7 imposed
Problems Part 1, 47 N.Y. ST. B.J. 23 (1975); Rockefeller, Franchising and the Antitrust Laws,
56 CHI. B. REC. 44-45 (1974).
4. For the instances in which manufacturers would wish to maintain such controls and
the forms in which these controls appear see the discussion beginning at text accompanying
note 88 infra.
5. Competitive pricing rations out the limited supply of goods to those who can afford to
satisfy their desires. Inherent in the economic system are determinations as to whom goods
will be allocated, i.e., who can afford them. P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMicS-AN INTRODUCTORY
ANALYSIS 60-61 (1961). Demand, in turn, signals changes in which goods are to be produced,
how, at what cost, and in what quantity. Equilibrium, of course, is reached where demand
and supply schedules for a particular good intersect. Id. at 64-67.
6. The specific enactment normally employed as a restraint upon distributive controls
imposed by manufacturers is § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1973), which
reads in pertinent part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal: . . .
7. The intricacies of territorial restraints will be discussed throughout this comment.
Generally, a vertical territorial or geographic restraint is any limitation which a seller imposes
on a buyer that limits the buyer's freedom to resell to persons wherever or from wherever the
buyer desires.
Two other types of vertical restraints, customer restrictions and resale price maintenance,
will only be analyzed as they relate to territorial restrictions. Customer restrictions limit the
class of customers with whom retailers or wholesalers may deal, and generally are found in
connection with other vertical restrictions. See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372
U.S. 253 (1963). Retail price maintenance, the imposition by the manufacturer of minimum
resale prices on goods, was the first type of vertical restraint to be reviewed by the courts
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by the manufacturer upon his dealers and with the manner in which
lower courts have agreed or disagreed with the Supreme Court over
the extent to which the Sherman Act should limit a manufacturer's
business decision to impose such restraints.
THE JUDICIAL EVOLUTION OF A PER SE RULE
In the first Supreme Court case to tackle any form of vertical
restraint, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons,' the Court
declared that the manufacturer's restrictions upon the resale price
of its medicines sold to wholesalers and retailers was a per se viola-
tion9 of § 1 of the Sherman Act. 10 Dr. Miles had argued that since a
manufacturer may choose not to sell to particular buyers,,a fortiori,
he could impose conditions upon those with whom he selected to
deal." To rebut this argument, Justice Hughes simply referred to
the normal invalidity of general restrictions upon alienation as au-
thority for stating that "every sort of restriction" may not be im-
posed upon purchasers." For the first time, the mystical ban on
"restraints upon alienation" was accepted without comment in an
analysis of manufacturer-imposed restrictions.
The main thrust of the opinion branded resale price maintenance
a per se violation and precluded any consideration of Dr. Miles'
contention that it had been damaged by price cutting. Although the
Court was firm in maligning such agreements, 3 it had difficulty
and is, therefore, important as a starting point for the analysis of such restraints in general.
See, e.g., United States v. Parke Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
The above-mentioned vertical restraints should be distinguished from horizontal terri-
torial, customer, and price restrictions which competing distributors impose upon each other.
Such horizontal arrangements have a longer history of judicial scrutiny and condemnation
and have traditionally been considered more abusive than vertical restraints. See, e.g.,
United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,
341 U.S. 593 (1951); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
8. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
9. For an explanation of the per se rule/"rule of reason" dichotomy see note 22 infra.
10. Dr. Miles had instigated the action itself, seeking an injunction to stop a wholesale
drug concern from inducing other drug companies to breach their resale price maintenance
agreements with plaintiff. The Court rejected the manufacturer's contention that it operated
a "consignment" method of distribution, and thus set the stage for the pronouncement of a
rule governing resale price maintenance under normal sales conditions. 220 U.S. at 398-99.
11. Id. at 404.
12. Id.
13. Without further comment the Court stated, "that these agreements restrain trade is
obvious." Id. at 400.
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explaining exactly how the manufacturer would be restraining trade
by its imposition of resale prices when "the advantage of established
retail prices primarily concerns the dealers"' 4 and not the manufac-
turers. Without actually accusing Dr. Miles of being a "pawn" of
its distributors, the Court invalidated its resale price program be-
cause it considered a vertically imposed price restriction to be as
pernicious as one initiated by the retailers themselves.'5 Thus, be-
cause the Court could not fathom the circumstances in which a
manufacturer would wish to impose resale price restrictions for
other than anticompetitive purposes, it held all such restraints to
be per se illegal.'"
In its first case to deal expressly with vertical territorial restric-
tion, White Motor Co. v. United States,'7 the Supreme Court was
less willing to impose a per se ban upon that form of manufacturer-
imposed restraint without some evidence of the economic milieu in
which it was created.'8 White had imposed upon distributors and
dealers of its trucks both territorial and customer restrictions," and
14. Id. at 407.
15. Horizontal price-fixing among competitors had long been a per se violation. See, e.g.,
Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905); Addyston Pipe & Co. v. United States,
175 U.S. 211 (1899); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
16. The Court somewhat cryptically darted over the discussion of how Dr. Miles could
use resale price maintenance for its own anticompetitive advantage when it stated:
If there be an advantage to a manufacturer in the maintenance of fixed retail prices,
the question remains whether it is one which he is entitled to secure by agreements
restricting the freedom of trade on the part of dealers who own what they sell.
220 U.S. at 407-08 (emphasis added).
17. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
18. Earlier circuit court cases dealing with the area of vertical territorial restrictions had
generally upheld such restraints. See, e.g., Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 124 F.2d
822 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 695 (1943); Phillips v. Iola Portland Cement Co.,
125 F. 593 (8th Cir. 1903), cert. denied, 192 U.S. 606 (1904).
19. 372 U.S. at 255. Typical of the territorial clauses used is the following:
Distributor is hereby granted the exclusive right, except as hereinafter provided, to
sell during the life of this agreement, in the territory described below, White and
Autocar trucks purchased from Company hereunder.
Distributor agrees to develop the aforementioned territory to the satisfaction of
Company, and not to sell any trucks purchased hereunder except in accordance with
this agreement, and not to sell such trucks except to individuals, firms, or corporations
having a place of business and/or purchasing headquarters in said territory.
Id. at 255-56.
Typical of the customer clause is the following:
Distributor further agrees not to sell nor to authorize his dealers to sell such trucks
to any Federal or State government or any department or political subdivision thereof,
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the district court, adopting the view that such restrictions were per
se illegal, granted a summary judgment for the government.20 In
reversing the district court and remanding the case for a trial on the
merits, the Court expressed its hesitancy to declare vertical terri-
torial restrictions illegal per se without an in-depth analysis of the
circumstances surrounding their use. 2' Justice Douglas' much
quoted opinion reflected a cautious approach to adding a new cate-
gory to the list of per se antitrust violations:2"
Horizontal territorial limitations, like "group boycotts, or
concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders" . . .
are naked restraints of trade with no purpose except stifling of
competition. A vertical territorial limitation may or may not
have that purpose or effect. We do not know enough of the
economic and business stuff out of which these arrangements
unless the right to do so is specifically granted by Company in writing.
Id. at 256.
20. United States v. White Motor Co., 194 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ohio 1961).
21. The Court stated:
This is the first case involving a territorial restriction in a vertical arrangement; and
we know too little of the actual impact of both that restriction and the one respecting
customers to reach a conclusion on the bare bones of the documentary evidence before
us.
372 U.S. at 261.
22. The general inquiry which a court makes concerning a violation of the antitrust laws
has been labeled the "rule of reason," since from the inception of Sherman Act litigation,
the Supreme Court had declared that only unreasonable restraints of trade will be barred.
The rule demands an inquiry into
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby pro-
motes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.
To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the
business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint
was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history
of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular rem-
edy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (emphasis added).
Some restraints, however, are labeled illegal per se since
their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclu-
sively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as
to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use.
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). Examples of such per se illegal
restrictions include tying an unpatented product to a patented article, International Salt Co.
v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); horizontal divisions of markets among competitors,
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); group boycotts, Fashion
Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); vertical price-fixing, United States v. Parke
Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); and horizontal price-fixing, Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram
& Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
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emerge to be certain. They may be too dangerous to sanction
or they may be allowable protections against aggressive com-
petitors or the only practicable means a small company has for
breaking into or staying in business . . . and within the "rule
of reason." We need to know more than we do about the actual
impact of these arrangements on competition to decide
whether they have such a "pernicious effect on competition
and lack . . . any redeeming virtue" . . and therefore should
be classified as per se violations of the Sherman Act.23
In reality, the White Court was authoring a neutral opinion; i.e.,
it was merely delaying its decision whether to declare vertical terri-
torial restrictions per se illegal until relevant data could be gathered
on the effects of such conduct. However, the attitudes expressed to
some degree by Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, and more
definitively by Justice Brennan, in his own concurring opinion, evi-
denced a propensity to endorse the "rule of reason" as the proper
standard for judging the validity of vertical territorial restrictions.
Justice Douglas analogized this area of manufacturer-imposed re-
straints to the merger field and commented that "in cases involving
the question whether a particular merger will tend 'substantially to
lessen competition' . . ., a trial rather than the use of the summary
judgment is normally necessary."24
This comment, coupled with a passing reference to the "failing
company" defense available to merging companies," may have been
an expression by the Court that such vertical restraints lack the
pernicious quality that would render them per se illegal.
Justice Brennan was more direct with his doubts about a per se
ban. He posited several economically rooted marketing factors for
the trial court to consider in assessing White's own justifications for
the restraints. White had defended its geographic limitations on the
grounds that, as a company incapable of vertical integration, the
use of restricted dealerships was the only feasible method of compet-
ing effectively with its large competitors." Justice Brennan empha-
sized the distinctions he saw between vertical and horizontal
23. 372 U.S. at 263 quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)
(citations omitted).
24. 372 U.S. at 264.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 256-57. White argued that to encourage its dealers to make vigorous sales efforts
in a particular area, it was imperative that it be able to offer protection to such dealers from
the competition of other distributors. Id.
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territorial restraints and between territorial restraints and resale
price maintenance-whereas horizontal divisions of markets and
resale price maintenance may have a distinctly pernicious effect
upon interbrand competition, the effect of manufacturer-imposed
geographic restrictions is less clear.27 If White's claims were valid,
then the restraints upon intrabrand distribution could be permissi-
ble attempts to promote more vigorous interbrand competition.
Indeed, Justice Brennan reiterated several other situations in which
territorial restrictions might be vital to a manufacturer's continued
existence, and thus acceptable even under antitrust scrutiny.28
Justice Clark, in his dissent, was vehemently in favor of declaring
all such vertical restraints a per se violation of the Sherman Act.29
Following the rationale of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park &
Sons Co. ,0 he characterized vertically imposed territorial restraints
as being no less anticompetitive than similar horizontal restric-
tions. 3' To the Dr. Miles Court and Justice Clark, the motive of the
manufacturer for imposing restrictions was irrelevant; the only sig-
nificant factor was the existence of a restraint that had the appear-
ance of a traditional form of cartelization. Justice Clark was unwill-
ing to concede that there existed any business justification for verti-
cal restraints other than the elimination of competition.32
The White decision gave the lower federal courts freedom to study
vertical territorial restraints and develop an appropriate method of
analysis for future judicial scrutiny. The only two circuits to take
up this post- White inquiry adopted the "rule of reason" approach
suggested by Justice Brennan. 33
27. Id. at 268.
28. Id. at 269. Justice Brennan suggested that a new entrant into a market might not be
able to induce distributors to deal with its product unless some territorial guarantees are
offered. Similarly, a manufacturer, to whom extensive advertising, promotion and servicing
are vital, might find that such territorial guarantees are the only way to insure that its
wholesalers and/or retailers will carry on these activities adequately. Id.
29. Id. at 276. He stated:
I believe that these "bare bones" really lay bare one of the most brazen violations
of the Sherman Act that I have experienced in a quarter of a century.
Id.
30. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
31. 322 U.S. at 279.
32. Id. at 281.
33. The two cases that dealt with vertical territorial restrictions after White Motor ac-
tually involved asserted violations of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. § 45 (1970), dealing with unfair trade practices. The courts, however, have consistently
1975
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In Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC,3 the Seventh Circuit adopted a
"rule of reason" approach without the inquiry into the significance
of such a rule that White had seemed to demand. The court rather
summarily concluded that White had declared vertical territorial
restrictions not to be per se violations of the Sherman Act.35 Having
thus decided to review the business justifications for Snap-On's
restrictions upon its dealers, the court went on to hold such re-
straints reasonable as necessary competition-promoting tactics.
Snap-On was a large manufacturer of mechanics' tools and re-
lated equipment which were distributed by independent dealers."
The nature of the tool industry was such that significant point-of-
sale services were necessary to effectively compete in the market 7.3
Dealers traveled directly to their customers' shops and places of
business and displayed their goods in mobile, walk-in trucks. This
enabled the dealers to provide on-the-spot demonstrations and to
develop continuing relationships with the mechanic-users.
The circuit court found that Snap-On's territorial restrictions
upon its dealers were necessary to the maintenance of these whole-
sale practices and that they were "not significantly anti-
competitive. ' 39 A minimal curtailment of intrabrand competition
would thus be tolerated to effectuate more vigorous interbrand
competition.
In Sandura Co. v. FTC,10 the Sixth Circuit similarly held that an
examination of the particular facts surrounding Sandura's imposi-
tion of territorial restraints was a necessary prerequisite to deter-
mining their legality. Sandura was a small, hard-surface floor cover-
ings manufacturer which was attempting to market a product that
few distributors were eager to handle." A previous campaign to sell
analyzed such alleged violations identically with those attacked under the Sherman Act, and
thus the holding of White Motor was controlling.
Most of the lower court cases dealing with vertical territorial restraints before White Motor
had also adopted a "rule of reason" approach. See, e.g., Chicago Sugar Co. v. American
Sugar Ref. Co., 176 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 948 (1950); Fosburgh v.
California & Hawaiian Sugar Ref. Co., 291 F. 29 (9th Cir. 1923).
34. 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
35. Id. at 828.
36. Id. at 827.
37. Id. at 828.
38. Id. at 829.
39. Id. at 832.
40. 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964).
41. Id. at 850-51.
Vol. 13: 937
Comment
this particular floor covering before all of the production defects
were eliminated had left the company in a critically poor financial
situation and had tarnished its reputation among the industry's
wholesalers and retailers." To enlist dealers to handle its product
and to induce them to expend money on the necessary advertising
and local services that it was unable to provide, Sandura promised
these distributors exclusive territories within which to deal.43 The
circuit court found these facts sufficient to justify the imposition of
"closed territories," placing great emphasis upon the fact that San-
dura would most likely have been unable to compete in the floor
covering industry without their implementation and continued
use.44 To reach this conclusion, the court developed a balancing test
whereby the perniciousness of the least restrictive vertical restraint
necessary to remain a viable competitor in the market was weighed
against the adverse effect upon interbrand competition.45
Despite this foundation of judicial tolerance for vertically im-
posed territorial restrictions, the government continued to press for
a declaration of their per se illegality. Barely four years after the
White Motor decision, the Supreme Court accepted the Justice
Department's appeal from a partially adverse decision in United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.4" The unusual procedural posture
of this appeal and the equivocal language of the opinion combined
to create a somewhat cryptic guide for the treatment of future
"closed territory" cases.
Schwinn was a large manufacturer of bicycles which distributed
its merchandise both by direct sales to distributors and retailers and
by sales to retailers through consignment agreements with the dis-
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 852-53.
45. Id. at 856. In this respect, the court was concerned with the severity of the vertical
restraint employed. The Federal Trade Commission argued that Sandura could have
achieved the same results by assigning "areas of primary responsibility" to its dealers rather
than the more restrictive "closed territories." With the former type of restraint, distributors
are assigned geographic areas for which they are to expend their best efforts, and the manu-
facturer may unlawfully refuse to deal with a distributor if he fails to adequately cover his
assigned area. Dealers are not prohibited from selling wherever they wish, but the burden of
the "primary area of responsibility" somewhat deters a distributor from overextending his
sales base.
The Sandura court found that Sandura's distributors would not have been willing to pro-
vide the services and advertising necessary unless they had been given completely "exclusive
territories."
46. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
1975
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tributors.'7 In the "sales" arrangement, title and dominion passed
directly to the retailer or distributor, but in the "consignment" or
"agency" arrangement, title and risk of loss remained with the man-
ufacturer until the bicycle was sold to the retail customer.48 The
manufacturer designated both the territories within which distribu-
tors could operate and the franchised retailers with whom they
could deal. 9 Schwinn defended these restrictions by insisting that
they were necessary for independent manufacturers to compete with
larger, vertically integrated producers capable of more sophisticated
marketing techniques. 0 Indeed, the government did not contend
that interbrand competition was adversely affected, but insisted
that the effect upon intrabrand competition alone constituted an
unreasonable restraint of trade.5
The district court held that Schwinn's territorial restrictions on
its wholesalers were per se violations of the Sherman Act when they
affected outright sales to the distributors," but were reasonable
under the "rule of reason" when employed in conjunction with the
agency or consignment arrangement.53 The lower court also ac-
cepted Schwinn's implementation of customer limitations upon its
wholesalers as a reasonable marketing technique.5
Schwinn did not appeal the decision of the district court, and
consequently, the lower court's pro-government pronouncement
concerning the per se illegality of vertical territorial restrictions in
a "sale" situation was not actually within the Supreme Court's
47. Id. at 370.
48. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323, 327-28 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
49. 388 U.S. at 371. The implementation of this regulated system of wholesale and retail
distribution was brought about by Schwinn's declining market share. In 1951, Schwinn had
the largest single share of the domestic bicycle market, 22.5% but, by 1961, this figure had
declined to 12.8%. Id. at 368. In an effort to regain some of its lost sales, Schwinn began to
streamline its marketing operations. It instituted the practice of selling only to franchised
bicycle dealers, and in this manner, reduced the number of retail outlets by 2/3. Wholesalers
were permitted to sell only to franchised dealers within their assigned territories and retailers
were restricted from selling to other retailers. Id. at 370-71.
50. Id. at 374-75. Schwinn was still a family-owned company which sold its bicycles
exclusively under its own label and primarily through private retail outlets. The vast majority
of bicycles sold by other manufacturers were sold under private labels by giant chains and
mass merchandisers, or by national concerns which operated their own stores and franchisers.
Id. at 368-69. See also discussion accompanying note 47 supra.
51. Id. at 369-70.
52. 237 F. Supp. at 342-43.
53. Id. at 342.
54. Id. at 343.
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scope of review. The United States had appealed the court's find-
ings that Schwinn's limitation of sales to "franchised" dealers and
its territorial restraints upon distributors used as agents were both
valid restraints under the "rule of reason."
The Supreme Court substantially accepted the lower court's dis-
tinctions based upon a "sale" versus a "consignment" arrangement.
It reversed the district court on the issue of customer restrictions;
such restraints were to be judged on the same basis as territorial
restrictions and were thus illegal limitations upon "wholesalers"
who obtained title to the goods.5" The Court, however, refused to
accept the government's contention that territorial restrictions in a
''consignment" arrangement were equally as pernicious as those
accompanying a "sale," and upheld the lower court on this issue.-"
Although the validity of territorial restrictions accompanying a
"sale" was not directly at issue on appeal. Justice Fortas wove his
opinion around the premise that such restraints were per se illegal:
As the District Court held, where a manufacturer sells prod-
ucts to his distributor subject to territorial restrictions upon
resale, a per se violation of the Sherman Act results. And, as
we have held, the same principle applies to restrictions of out-
lets with which the distributors may deal and to restraints
upon retailers to whom the goods are sold. Under the Sherman
Act, it is unreasonable without more for a manufacturer to seek
to restrict and confine areas or persons with whom an article
may be traded after the manufacturer has parted with domin-
ion over it. White Motor, supra; Dr. Miles, supra. Such re-
straints are so obviously destructive of competition that their
mere existence is enough. If the manufacturer parts with do-
minion over his product or transfers risk of loss to another, he
may not reserve control over its destiny or the conditions of its
resale.57
55. 388 U.S. at 377-78.
[Tihe decree should be revised to enjoin any limitation upon the freedom of distribu-
tors to dispose of the Schwinn products, which they have bought from Schwinn, where
and to whomever they choose. The principle is, of course, equally applicable to sales
to retailers, and the decree should similarly enjoin the making of any sales to retailers
upon any condition, agreement or understanding limiting the retailer's freedom as to
where and to whom it will resell the products.
Id. at 378.
56. Id. at 380-82.
57. Id. at 379.
1975
Duquesne Law Review
The language of Schwinn seemed clear: any restraint imposed by
a manufacturer upon the resale of goods that he has sold to his
distributors constitutes a per se violation of the Sherman Act. On
the other hand, where such restraint accompanies an "agency" or
"consignment" arrangement, its validity will be tested by the "rule
of reason.""5
THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC BASES FOR THE Schwinn DECISION
Although the main objective of the Schwinn decision appeared to
be the inclusion of "sale-related" vertical territorial and customer
restraints within the list of per se violations of the Sherman Act,
there were several counter-indicia that cast doubt upon the scope
of that conclusion. First, there was a peculiarly vague phrase used
by Justice Fortas within his discussion on the per se illegality of
territorial and customer restrictions: "Under the Sherman Act, it is
unreasonable without more for a manufacturer to seek to restrict
and confine areas or persons with whom an article may be traded
after the manufacturer has parted with dominion over it.""5 The
words "without more" contradict the usual meaning attached to a
per se ban, since they would imply that when certain additional
factors were present, vertical restrictions would be justified even
when dominion and control over the goods have been relinquished.
Buttressing this view is the fact that the Schwinn Court never spe-
cifically stated that it was overruling the White Motor's philosophy
concerning the need to evaluate the specific facts of each case. In-
deed, Justice Fortas' reference to that case seemed to indicate its
continued viability:
We first observe that the facts of this case do not come within
the specific illustrations which the Court in White Motor artic-
ulated as possible factors relevant to a showing that the chal-
lenged vertical restraint is sheltered by the rule of reason be-
cause it is not anticompetitive. Schwinn was not a newcomer,
58. Id. at 380.
Where the manufacturer retains title, dominion, and risk with respect to the product
and the position and function of the dealer in question are, in fact, indistinguishable
from those of an agent or salesman of the manufacturer; it is only if the impact of the
confinement is "unreasonably" restrictive of competition that a violation of § 1 results
from such confinement, unencumbered by culpable price fixing.
Id.
59. Id. at 379 (emphasis added). This statement is set forth more fully in content at
quoted text accompanying note 57 supra.
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seeking to break into or stay in the bicycle business. It was not
a "failing company.""
Therefore, at least the two specific defenses of a "newcomer" or
"failing company" would seem to be available to future litigants;
and the "without more" language may imply that other defenses are
also available. As this comment will more fully discuss later, various
lower courts have used this language to counter a per se rule.6'
Secondly, the Court specifically stated that it was "remitted to
an appraisal of the market impact of these practices"62 because the
government had not contended for a per se rule; but such an analy-
sis of the practical effect of a particular litigant's market procedures
would directly conflict with Justice Fortas' later remarks that seem-
ingly precluded any inquiry into the reasonableness of the re-
straints. 3 It could be reasoned that the Court was only willing to
look at the record to pass upon the legality of the "consignment"
arrangements, but the general language employed seems to negate
such an inference.
It is also interesting to note what significance the Supreme Court
justices themselves have given to the Schwinn decision. In United
States v. Sealy,64 decided the same day as Schwinn, the Court
struck down as a per se violation a territorial allocation system
imposed by a licensor of the Sealy mattress trademark upon its
licensees. Using White Motor as controlling authority, the Court
reiterated the different antitrust treatment afforded horizontal ver-
sus vertical territorial restraints, 5 and then proceeded painstakingly
to characterize the Sealy licensing arrangement as horizontal in
nature so as to fall within the per se rule.6 If the impact of Schwinn
was to make all vertical territorial restrictions per se illegal when
dominion and control are relinquished, then such a careful analysis
60. Id. at 374.
61. See text accompanying notes 107-14 infra.
62. 388 U.S. at 373.
63. See quote in text at note 57 supra.
64. 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
65. Id. at 352.
Because this Court has distinguished between horizontal and vertical territorial limita-
tions for purposes of the impact of the Sherman Act, it is first necessary to determine
whether the territorial arrangements here are to be treated as the creature of the
licensor, Sealy, or as the product oi a horizontal arrangement among the licensees.
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
Id.
66. Id. at 352-53.
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of the licensor's marketing structure would not have been needed;
either a horizontal or vertical arrangement would have invoked the
per se rule. Similarly, in United States v. Topco,67 a case decided
almost five years after Sealy and Schwinn, the Court again empha-
sized the horizontal nature of a trademark licensing scheme em-
ployed by independent grocery chains to apply a per se rule of inval-
idity." What is even more startling about this decision is that
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co." was cited to support the
proposition that horizontal territorial limitations are per se viola-
tions of the Sherman Act.70 No mention of vertical territorial re-
straints was made in the Topco opinion or in any subsequent Su-
preme Court opinion discussing per se classifications.
Although the previously discussed factors can hardly be ignored
in an analysis of the Schwinn decision, the overall impact of the
opinion seems clearly to be the establishment of some sort of per se
rule of invalidity for certain territorial restrictions. The restrictions
employed by the Schwinn Company were typical of territorial re-
straints used by countless other manufacturers, so that it would be
difficult to limit the scope of Schwinn to a particularly pernicious
type of restraint. The mere fact that the Supreme Court found
identical restrictions reasonable in a "consignment" arrangement
but invalid in a "sales" situation can only indicate the creation of
a "new" standard of review for territorial restrictions where title to
goods has passed to a third party.
Accepting the fact that Schwinn does, at the very least, establish
a "modified" per se rule, it is somewhat difficult to understand why
the Court chose to do so. From a precedential standpoint the
Schwinn decision stands on shaky ground; a well-established body
of case law had developed and approved the "rule of reason" ap-
proach to territorial restrictions both before the Supreme Court's
67. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
68. Id. at 608-09.
69. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
70. 405 U.S. at 608. Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent, criticized the majority opinion
for citing Schwinn for this proposition, noting that the Schwinn Court had specifically stated
that it was dealing with vertical, not horizontal restraints. Id. at 617-18.
The Chief Justice also stated unequivocally that Schwinn was decided under a "rule of
reason," not under a per se rule, citing the language quoted in text at note 60 supra to support
his view. Id.
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decision in White Motor71 and after.72 The Schwinn opinion is con-
spicuously void of any reference to these lower court cases, and that
omission is all the more significant since two circuit courts had
recently rejected a per se rule." No matter what the Court may have
envisioned the import of Schwinn to be, some mention of the estab-
lished case law would have been desirable as a guide to understand-
ing the Court's changed outlook. Both the Sixth and Seventh Cir-
cuits had authored well-reasoned opinions in support of territorial
restrictions under the particular facts presented to their courts, and
the failure of the Supreme Court to consider those cases in its opin-
ion adds even more support to the theory that Schwinn did not
establish an absolute per se rule of invalidity for "sales" situations.
What the Court did rely upon for its decision was the "ancient
rule against restraints on alienation. ' 74 This vague doctrine, al-
though somewhat rooted in Anglo-Saxon property law, was not a
familiar tenet in the American law of personalty.7 Justice Fortas
cited several cases to support the application of the rule within the
realm of antitrust analysis, but of these, only Dr. Miles Medical had
made reference to it 7 -a fleeting reference devoid of any antitrust
support. The remaining cases all dealt with concerted efforts by
manufacturers and distributors to employ sales restrictions in an
effort to eliminate competitors 7 or to fix resale prices. 8 They could
hardly support the proposition that the rule against restraints upon
alienation prohibits the manufacturer from unilaterally imposing
restrictions upon the resale of its goods when neither an effect upon
71. See, e.g., Chicago Sugar Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co. 176 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 948 (1950); Fosburgh v. California & Hawaiian Sugar Ref. Co., 291 F.
29 (9th Cir. 1923); Cole Motor Car Co. v. Hurst, 228 F. 280 (5th Cir. 1915), cert. denied, 247
U.S. 511 (1918); Phillips v. Iola Portland Cement Co., 125 F. 593 (8th Cir. 1903), cert. denied,
192 U.S. 606 (1904).
72. See Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964); Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC,
321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
73. See note 72 supra.
74. 388 U.S. at 380.
75. See 388 U.S. at 391-92 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
76. 220 U.S. at 404-05.
77. United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966) (automobile manufacturer
and distributors conspired to eliminate unfranchised "discount" retailers); Klor's Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (group boycott by manufacturers and dis-
tributors of electrical appliances not to sell to one competing retailer); Fashion Originators'
Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (garment and textile manufacturers conspired to eliminate
competitors who "pirated" their original designs by refusing to sell to retailers and other
manufacturers who dealt with such competitors).
78. United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944) (distributor of
optical lenses carefully regulated the method of distribution and the resale price from its
wholesalers to retailers).
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its own competitors nor a conspiracy of its own distributors is in-
volved.
Another basic flaw in the Schwinn opinion is the absence of a
definitive statement concerning the purpose of the antitrust laws.79
The confusion accompanying that decision stems somewhat from
the divergence of views concerning the proper interpretation of the
antitrust legislation. Whereas some judges have clearly stated that
the lessening of any form of intrabrand competition by vertical re-
straints is a prohibited restraint of trade no matter what the effect
on interbrand competition," others consider the ultimate effect
upon the latter to be the major concern. 8' From the standpoints of
judicial consistency and consumer benefit, it would appear that a
strict per se ban against the lessening of any form of competition
via territorial restraints is uncalled for. At a very early date, the
Supreme Court recognized the fact that only unreasonable re-
straints of trade are prohibited by the antitrust laws.82 Since almost
every agreement between business entities has as its purpose the
lessening of competition to some degree, it would certainly be devas-
tating to the business community to say that the elimination of any
form of competition whatsoever is unreasonable. 3 The Court has
traditionally recognized certain instances where the ancillary less-
ening of one form of competition has been tolerated as a necessary
and justifiable consequence of a business practice which increases
economic efficiency in the marketplace, but does not harm the con-
sumer by increasing monopoly profits.84 Mergers, for example, have
consistently been analyzed with this concept in mind, since to state
79. The basic ideas developed within the following discussion were suggested primarily
by Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribu-
tion, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Posner] and Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept, 75 YALE
L. J. 375 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Bork].
80. See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 278-81 (1963) (Clark, J.,
dissenting); cf. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (Fortas, J.,
opinion of the Court).
81. See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 268-69 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring); Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847, 854-55 (6th Cir. 1964); Snap-On Tools
Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825, 831-32 (7th Cir. 1963); cf. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &
Co., 388 U.S. 365, 382-94 (1967) (Stewart & Harlan, J.J., dissenting).
82. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958); see discussion at note 22
supra.
83. See Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 404-05 (1904) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
84. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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that the lessening of any form of competition is per se illegal would
be to declare that every merger is prohibited. Vertical territorial
restraints, like mergers, should be judged on the basis of their over-
all effect upon the competitive market.
The antitrust laws have generally been considered to have as their
main purpose the perpetuation of as nearly perfect competition85 as
possible within any one particular area of commerce. 6 In terms of
manufacturer-imposed restraints, therefore, the antitrust analysis
should focus upon the extent to which such restrictions actually
enable a manufacturer to artificially increase his profit margin at
the expense of the consumer by cutting his output and increasing
prices.8" A consideration of the interbrand versus intrabrand effect
becomes much less important than a full understanding of the mo-
tives for manufacturers to impose such restraints upon their distrib-
utors and the likely result of these restraints in any particular dis-
tributive situation.
Many economists and commentators have suggested that there
are only two basic reasons why a manufacturer would implement
vertical restraints in the form of resale price maintenance, territorial
allocations, or customer allocations upon his distributors: either he
is the pawn of a distributor's cartel or he wishes to increase his own
distributive efficiency. 8 The former situation would create a defi-
85. "Perfect competition" is actually a model of economic analysis that has not been
obtained in any real market or industry. It requires that there be a sufficient number of buyers
and sellers with no barriers to entry of the market so that each individual seller takes the
market price as established by "supply and demand," i.e., he can sell as much or as little as
he wants at the market price without affecting such price.
No industry or line of commerce is perfectly competitive; there are always some barriers
to entry of the market. Oligopolies (markets in which there are only a small number of sellers)
and monopolies (markets in which there is only one seller) exist when there are more extreme
barriers to entry in the form of legal restraints such as patents or franchises, natural deter-
rents such as the need for excessive capital investments, or predatory practices such as
boycotts, tie-ins, etc.
86. See Markovits, Some Preliminary Notes on the American Antitrust Laws' Economic
Tests of Legality, 27 STAN. L. REV. 841, 850-51 (1975). Although Professor Markovits does not
agree that this economic test is completely adequate, he does recognize that it has been used
most frequently. Id.
87. See Bork, supra note 79; Posner, Exclusionary Practices and the Antitrust Laws, 41
U. CHI. L. REV. 506 (1974).
88. See Bork, supra note 79, at 403; Posner, supra note 79, at 283. There is also the
possibility that the manufacturer is involved in a manufacturers' cartel and is employing a
form of vertical restraint such as resale price maintenance as a means of "policing" the cartel.
If the manufacturers are artificially setting higher prices and reducing their output in an
effort to reap monopoly profits, they must be certain that no member is underselling the other
1975
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nite antitrust violation since the only purpose of a cartel is the
reduction of output and the collection of monopoly profits." If such
a cartel is not the motive, economic "common sense" dictates that
the manufacturer is not attempting to restrict output. Any restric-
tions upon distributors in the form of resale price maintenance or
"exclusive territories" that had the effect of reducing output would
lower the manufacturer's own profits while increasing those of his
distributors. Since no rational manufacturer would attempt to lower
his own profits intentionally, his only motive for implementing vert-
ical restraints upon his distributors would be to enhance the effi-
ciency of his distributive efforts.
Although there are numerous ways that a division of markets may
enhance a manufacturer's efficiency, 0 one of the most important in
terms of antitrust analysis seems to be the "optimization of local
sales efforts." In many instances a manufacturer may feel that his
product will not be properly marketed unless the distributor main-
tains a well-stocked inventory, an elaborate showroom, a uniquely
trained sales force that provides personalized services to its custom-
ers, etc. If the distributors were left free to respond only to the
demands of the retail customers, then undoubtedly many of them
would develop the point-of-sale services that the manufacturer de-
cartel participants. It is extremely difficult to detect such "cheating" since a lower retail price
may be a function either of a retailer's efficient operation, lower profit margin, etc., or a
reduced price from the manufacturer. If all of the cartel manufacturers employ resale price
maintenance, then an individual manufacturer is discouraged from lowering the price at
which he sells to his distributors since any advantage from such lowered prices can only
accrue to the wholesalers or retailers.
The instances in which a manufacturers' cartel would employ such resale price mainte-
nance are few and should be easily detected. Bork, supra note 79, at 411-15. The use of "closed
territories" or "exclusive outlets" could not solve the "policing" problem of a cartel and,
therefore, implementation of one of these types of restraint would not suggest such illegal
conduct. Bork, supra note 79, at 411.
89. A cartel is an arrangement in which producers or distributors of a product agree to
limit output in an effort to increase monopoly profits. For distributors to effectively create
such a cartel, they would have to include all or most of the manufacturers within the relative
product market, otherwise buyers could substitute one brand for another and undermine the
cartel's price-maximizing effect. Posner, supra note 79, at 283.
90. Professor Bork suggests the following in addition to "optimizing local sales efforts":
1. Encouraging exchanges of information;
2. Minimizing the costs of providing post-sales services and minimizing the risks of cus-
tomer dissatisfaction;
3. Preventing overlapping use of a service whose cost is shared;
4. Preventing duplication of costs and customer irritation due to overlapping distributive
effort. Bork, supra note 79, at 430.
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sired in an effort to win customers from other wholesalers. But a few
distributors at least would decide not to provide these services
themselves, preferring rather to take a "free ride" on the services
provided by other distributors. By way of example, if hand tool
distributor A maintained a fleet of well-stocked "walk-in" trucks in
which he traveled to local tool shops and gave personalized demon-
strations to prospective customers, then hand tool distributor B
could open a cut-rate mail order operation and supply the tools to
the shops at lower prices after A's demonstration had influenced
them to buy. Under these circumstances, it would not be long before
distributor A would abandon his expensive sales operation and
begin to compete with B as equally as possible. At that point, the
manufacturer would be unable to receive the best local marketing
techniques for his product, and larger vertically integrated manu-
facturers who controlled their entire distributive operations would
have a distinct advantage.'
One way for a manufacturer to avoid this problem is to grant
exclusive territories in exchange for a distributor's promise to pro-
vide the point-of-sale services desired." The manufacturer employ-
ing these restraints is indeed limiting intrabrand competition at the
wholesale and/or retail level but, under this prevailing economic
theory, unless he is the pawn of a reseller's cartel, he is doing so in
an effort to create a more efficient marketing operation and increase
interbrand competition. The elimination of competition at the
wholesale or resale level can never increase the manufacturer's mar-
ket share since he is only controlling the distributive efforts that
correspond to his established rate of production. His market control
is fixed in the same way as a manufacturer who is vertically inte-
grated, and thus the elimination of distributors cannot increase the
manufacturer's power to restrict output. 3
91. This example is essentially the situation presented in Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC,
321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
92. The "free ride" problem may also be eliminated by a scheme of manufacturer-
imposed resale price maintenance. If manufacturer B in the example were unable to sell at a
price lower than X dollars, he would then be forced to provide the same point-of-sale services
that other distributors could supply at that price, for if he provided fewer services, the
customers would buy from other distributors who offered more for the same price of X dollars.
Since resale price maintenance is employed by manufacturers for similar motives as terri-
torial restrictions, it would seem that the same criteria should govern both types of restric-
tions. Bork, supra note 79; Posner, supra note 79. But see United States v. White Motor Co.,
372 U.S. at 268 (Brennan, J., concurring).
93. Bork, supra note 79, at 402.
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Taking these economic factors into consideration, a per se rule of
illegality for vertical territorial restrictions seems both harmful and
unnecessary. Increased efficiency of the distribution process is a
valid motive for imposing vertical restrictions, and where this can
be accomplished without harm to the consumer, it should be accept-
able as a reasonable restraint of trade. The mere likelihood that
some vertical territorial restrictions may be employed to disguise
dealer cartels does not seem a valid justification for prohibiting all
such restraints; the courts should not find it so difficult to recognize
and strike down the latter."
THE JUDICIAL EROSION OF A PER SE RULE
Although the economic and legal bases for Schwinn's holding may
have been questionable, the message of that case was clearly the
condemnation of vertical territorial restrictions in a "sales" situa-
tion without-regard to the reasonableness of the restraint. Nonethe-
less, the number of cases in which this new rule has been unequivo-
cally responsible for the condemnation of vertical territorial re-
straints is few. 5 The lower federal and state courts, in the best
94. Id. at 405-11.
At this point it should be noted that the preceding economic analysis and conclusions are
not unanimously accepted by economists. This author has read various articles attempting
to explain the economic bases for manufacturer-imposed vertical restraints, and has pre-
sented the views of Professors Bork and Posner as the most persuasive to him.
Professor Comanor, the most prominent opponent of Professor Bork, feels that vertical
territorial restraints should be held per se illegal since they allow for a misallocation of
resources in the marketplace. According to his theory, the point-of-sale services demanded
by the manufacturer may not necessarily coincide with the wants of the consumer. Comanor,
Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White Motor and Its Aftermath, 81 HARv. L.
REv. 1419 (1968). Contra, Bork, supra note 79, at 421-22. See also Zimmerman, Distribution
Restrictions After Sealy And Schwinn, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 1181 (1967).
95. See United States v. Revlon, Inc., 1975 Trade Cas. 60,202 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); GTE
Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 1974 Trade Cas. 75,072 (9th Cir. 1974), petition for
rehearing en banc granted and opinions withdrawn, 1974 Trade Cas. 75,435 (9th Cir. 1974);
Eastex Aviation, Inc. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 367 F. Supp. 868 (E.D. Tex. 1973); Cook
v. Ralston Purina Co., 366 F. Supp. 999 (M.D. Ga. 1973); Dobbins v. Kawasaki Motors Corp.,
362 F. Supp. 54 (D. Ore. 1973); United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 302 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C.
1969), rev'd on other grounds, 410 U.S. 52 (1973).
Schwinn has also been relied upon to condemn vertical territorial restraints in cases in
which the legality of such restrictions was not the primary basis of the cause of action. See,
e.g., Hensley Equip. Co. v. Esco Corp., 383 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1967) (illegal vertical territorial
restraint constituted patent misuse); Clairol Inc. v. Cosmetics Plus, 325 A.2d 505 (N.J. Super.
Ct. 1974) (cosmetic manufacturer brought suit to enjoin distributor from injuring its good will
by distributing professional merchandise to general public).
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tradition of judicial creativity, quickly began to distinguish
Schwinn's mandate and to develop a number of exceptions and
mandatory prerequisites to the application of the rule.
At least three circuits," and possibly four,97 have adopted what
has come to be known as the "firm and resolute" enforcement re-
quirement. Grasping at the statement in Schwinn that the manu-
facturer had affirmatively enforced its territorial restrictions with
threats of termination," these courts have made such enforcement
of compliance a necessary element of a cause of action against man-
ufacturers employing territorial restraints. The mere existence of a
restrictive clause in a franchise agreement has been held not to
constitute a per se violation. In the first case to adopt such a view,
Janel Sales Corp. v. Lanvin Parfums, Inc.," the Second Circuit held
that a clause specifically restricting sales of cosmetics to consum-
ers'00 was not a per se violation since the evidence was at best con-
flicting as to how insistent Lanvin was in enforcing compliance.','
Other courts, following this reasoning, refused to declare naked con-
tractual clauses per se illegal,0 2 and at least one court has construed
Other courts have cited Schwinn for the proposition that challenged vertical restraints were
per se illegal when price fixing was also involved. Such reliance was unnecessary since vertical
restraints imposed in conjunction with a plan of resale price maintenance had long been
considered per se illegal under the rule of United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321
U.S. 707 (1944).
96. Good Inv. Promotions, Inc. v. Coming Glass Works, 493 F.2d 891 (6th Cir. 1974);
Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
987 (1973); Janel Sales Corp. v. Lanvin Parfums, Inc., 396 F.2d 398 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 938 (1968).
97. Reed Bros., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 1975 Trade Cas. 60,329 (8th Cir. 1975) (court
stated that manufacturer had "firmly and resolutely" enforced its territorial restrictions).
98. The Schwinn Court stated:
In any event, it is clear and entirely consistent with the District Court's findings that
Schwinn has been "firm and resolute" in insisting upon observance of territorial and
customer limitations by its bicycle distributors and upon confining sales by franchised
retailers to consumers, and that Schwinn's "firmness" in these respects was grounded
upon the communicated danger of termination.
388 U.S. at 372.
99. 396 F.2d 398 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 938 (1968).
100. The clause provided:
(6) "Retailer" will not, where statute or law permits such restriction, sell any of the
"Commodities" except to consumers for use.
396 F.2d at 400.
101. Id. at 406-07.
102. See Good Inv. Promotions, Inc. v. Corning Glass Works, 493 F.2d 891 (6th Cir. 1974);
Bougeois v. A.B. Dick Co., 386 F. Supp. 1094 (W.D. La. 1974); Knutson v. Daily Review,
Inc., 383 F. Supp. 1346 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
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such an "unenforced" provision to be no more than a permissible
"area of primary responsibility clause."' 03
Although these courts may be laudable in their attempts to cir-
cumvent a decision they seemingly view as economically unsound,
there is no firm legal basis for demanding a showing of actual en-
forcement of an agreement as a prerequisite to the establishment of
an antitrust violation. The Schwinn Court did mention the fact that
"firm and resolute" coercion was involved in that case, but proof of
enforcement has never been an essential element of a cause of action
under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 04 The offensive agreement or
combination standing alone is enough to constitute a violation05
and the term "combination" has been loosely defined to include a
"unilateral act committed by a first party in dealing with a second
party wherein the latter concurs in the former's act and related
policies with knowledge of their intended effect."''0 Deference to the
actual Supreme Court mandate in Schwinn would dictate per se
illegality for vertical territorial restrictions whether or not they were
resolutely enforced, and the side-stepping of these courts must
therefore be viewed as an indication of judicial displeasure with the
rule.
375 F. Supp. 610 (E.D. Pa. 1974); A. P. Hopkins Corp. v. Studebaker Corp., 355 F. Supp.
816 (E.D. Mich. 1972), aff'd, 496 F.2d 969 (6th Cir. 1974); cf. Bowen v. New York News, Inc.,
1975 Trade Cas. 60,415 (2d Cir. 1975) ("firm and resolute" enforcement evidence not needed
because of existence of conspiracy between newspaper and franchise dealers); Fairfield
County Beverage Distribs., Inc. v. Narragansett Brewing Co., 378 F. Supp. 376 (D. Conn.
1974) (court found manufacturer had enforced territorial restrictions, but held that state
liquor law sanctioning restraints immunized them from antitrust scrutiny); Ansul Co. v.
Uniroyal Inc., 306 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd in pertinent part, 448 F.2d 872 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1018 (1972) (court held restrictions to be firmly and reso-
lutely enforced). But see Hobart Bros. Co. v. Malcolm T. Gilliland, Inc., 471 F.2d 894 (5th
Cir. 1973).
103. Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637 (10th Cir. 1973). In this
case, a written agreement between the manufacturer and distributor established an exclusive
distributorship within a specified geographic area. The court, noting that no contract provi-
sion or conduct on the part of the manufacturer had actually forbidden the distributor from
selling wherever he pleased, construed the contract language to be no more than a description
of a primary marketing territory and as such not a per se violation. 472 F.2d at 639. For a
definition of an "area of primary responsibility" clause see note 122 infra.
104. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
105. United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956); United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 402 (1927).
106. Sunny Hill Farms Dairy Co. v. Kraftco Corp., 381 F. Supp. 845 (E.D. Mo. 1974),
paraphrasing the holding of Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). See also United
States v. Parke Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
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Another group of cases has used the "without more" language'017
of the Schwinn opinion to limit the per se rule's applicability to the
narrowest of situations. In Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp.,10s the Third
Circuit stated that Schwinn merely holds illegal per se those re-
straints employed solely as a means of competing more effectively
in the market, and does not apply to situations where there are other
reasonable motives for such restraints. In that case, the assertion by
Wella that its customer restrictions were employed as legitimate
safety precautions was enough to bring the "rule of reason" into
play.10 The court then concluded that it was reasonable for Wella
to limit the resale of certain of its products to the professional
beauty trade as a means of protecting the non-professional con-
sumer from misuse of these dangerous products and to protect itself
from potential product liability."0 One court, following the Tripoli
rationale, held that a manufacturer may enjoin its distributors from
selling "professional" hair. products to non-professional customers
where such sales may expose the manufacturer to tort liability and
adversely affect its reputation and good will,"' and a state court of
appeals had directed its trial courts to apply the "rule of reason" to
analyze vertical restraints imposed by a fast food chicken franchisor
for the purpose of quality control."'
Other courts facing similar factual circumstances have declined
to read any "consumer safety" or "protection from tort liability or
loss of good will" exceptions into the Schwinn holding. In United
States v. Glaxo Group Ltd. ," the district court held that the use of
107. See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.
108. 425 F.2d 932 (3rd Cir. 1970).
109. Id. at 936.
110. Id. at 937-38. The court noted that the hair conditioners packaged for professional
use are made with a different formula than those for home use; are meant to be applied
differently; and come packaged with instructions printed on the carton rather than on the
individual packages. Id. at 937. See Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. United States, 449 F.2d 1374 (Ct.
Cl. 1971) (court applied "rule of reason" to test vertical restraints on resale of drug meproba-
mate); cf. United States v. Safety First Products Corp., 1972 Trade Cas. 74,223 (S.D.N.Y.
.1972) (consent order allowing restrictions of sales of dangerous fire protection equipment to
"qualified persons"); United States v. Fisons Ltd., 1972 Trade Cas. 73,794 (N.D. Ill. 1972)
(consent order in which manufacturer agreed to discontinue restraints upon resale of drugs).
111. Clairol, Inc. v. Asaro, 1975 Trade Cas. 60,350 (E.D. Mich. 1975). See also Clairol
Inc. v. Cosmetics Plus, 325 A.2d 505 (N.J. Superior Ct. 1974) (court rejected Tripoli exception
yet, nonetheless, enjoined distributors from reselling to non-professionals hair products that
required special skills to administer).
112. La Fortune v. Ebie, 26 Cal. App. 3d 72, 102 Cal. Rptr. 588 (Ct. App. 1972).
113. 302 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 410 U.S. 52 (1973).
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resale restrictions to "insure proper medical standards" for the pro-
duction of antibiotic drugs was a per se violation regardless of the
legitimate safety and health motives."'
In a somewhat analogous area, several courts have wrestled with
the plausibility of an exception to Schwinn based upon the unique-
ness of the product. In Adolph Coors Co. v. FTC,"' a beer manufac-
turer insisted that its unique brewing process made it imperative to
control the speed and method of distribution of its beer and that
such quality control could only be achieved by restricting the whole-
sale dealers."' The Tenth Circuit conceded that in its judgment the
"per se rule should yield to situations where a unique product re-
quires territorial restrictions to remain in business,"" 7 but felt com-
pelled to follow what it considered Schwinn's inflexible ban of such
vertical restraints. 1 8 The Fifth Circuit,"' reviewing the same
brewer's justifications for resale restrictions, was less willing to dis-
card altogether the possibility of a "quality control" exception.
However, the court felt that, even assuming the validity of such a
rule, in this instance vertical territorial restraints had not been
proven to be essential to the continued integrity of the product, and
thus constituted unreasonable restraints of trade. 21 In addition, the
court found that the geographic controls were ancillary to a scheme
of resale price maintenance, and therefore illegal per se without
114. Id. at 9; cf. United States v. Fisons Ltd., 1972 Trade Cas. 73,794 (N.D. Ill. 1972)
(consent decree in which manufacturer agreed to discontinue restrictions on resale of drugs).
115. 497 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 775 (1975).
116. Id. at 1187. The beer is made by a type of brewing process that requires quick
refrigerated marketing to assure its quality. The brewer restricted the territories within which
its distributors could sell and thereby kept strict control over proper refrigerated storage and
elimination of stale beer. Id. at 1182.
117. Id. at 1187.
118. It was actually not necessary for the court to base its analysis upon Schwinn, since
there was evidence of price fixing. Vertical territorial restraints ancillary to a scheme of resale
price maintenance had long been held per se illegal under the rule of United States v. Bausch
& Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944). See Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, Inc.,
1975 Trade Cas. 60,187 (D. Col. 1975).
119. Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1975), rehearing en
banc denied, 509 F.2d 758 (5th Cir. 1975).
120. Id. at 944-45. The court was extremely wary of developing such a "quality control"
exception for unique products since it anticipated that most every manufacturer would con-
sider its product "unique" in some way. It also stated that such an exception could only he
tolerated in extreme cases where the manufacturer could not remain in business employing
less restrictive marketing practices. Id. at 947; cf. Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 610 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (brewer alleged that restrictions were necessary
for quality control but court found evidence did not support such claim).
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regard to the exact import of Schwinn.12'
In light of the judicial eagerness to carve out the above noted
exceptions in areas that seem particularly close to the factual situa-
tion in Schwinn, i.e., where a restraint upon the alienation of the
sale of a good actually occurs, it is not surprising that most courts
have refused to stretch the rule to eliminate less restrictive mea-
sures. Thus, "area of primary responsibility" clauses' have been
upheld,'2 3 at least where they are not merely disguising an enforced
restraint upon alienation. 4 Similar judicial acceptance has gener-
ally been given to "exclusive territories""1 5 and "location"'2 6 and
121. Id. at 947-48; see note 118 supra.
Some beer and liquor manufacturers may find help in the twenty-first amendment to the
United States Constitution, since a- state law encouraging brewers to set up and enforce
geographical areas of distribution for its dealers was held to pre-empt the federal antitrust
laws. Fairfield County Beverage Distribs. Inc. v. Narragansett Brewing Co., 378 F. Supp. 376
(D. Conn. 1974). The Constitution will not provide a defense, however, unless a state legisla-
tively sanctions such restrictions for the distribution of beer or alcohol. Adolph Coors Co. v.
A & S Wholesalers, Inc., 1975 Trade Cas. 60,187 (D. Col. 1975).
122. An "area of primary responsibility" clause is a contractual arrangement whereby the
manufacturer, rather than confining the dealer's sales to a specific geographic area, merely
makes the dealer responsible for a "best effort" within defined boundaries and may thereafter
discontinue the dealership if the "area of primary responsibility" is not covered adequately.
In a practical sense, this device discourages to some degree sales outside of the dealer's
assigned territory since the dealer must concentrate his efforts on meeting his territorial
quotas. Most courts, however, in an obvious attempt to reach a more realistic view of manu-
facturers' marketing needs, have sanctioned these restraints since the dealer is technically
not confined to any specific area. Such devices were given specific recognition by Justice
Brennan in his concurring opinion in White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 271-
72 (1963).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Associates, 319 F. Supp. 1037 (N.D. Ill. 1973), aff'd
per curiam, 414 U.S. 801 (1973); Plastic Pkg'g Materials, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 327 F. Supp.
213 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (contract provisions setting out a "primary responsibility area" not illegal
even though there was some evidence of the manufacturer "advising" the distributor to stay
within bounds).
124. See Hobart Bros. Co. v. Malcolm T. Gilliland, Inc., 471 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1973)
("primary responsibility" clause per se illegal since silent understanding expanded it into a
territorial restriction).
125. See, e.g., Trixler Brokerage Co. v. Ralston Purina Co., 1974 Trade Cas. 75,357 (9th
Cir. 1974); Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1972); Elder-Beerman Stores
Corp. v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 459 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1972); Western Wholesale Liquor
Co. v. Gibson Wine Co., 372 F. Supp. 802 (D.S.D. 1974); Beckman v. Walter Kidde & Co.,
316 F. Supp. 1321 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 451 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
408 U.S. 922 (1972).
The grant of an "exclusive territory" is the promise by a manufacturer not to employ
another dealer or sell to anyone else located within a specific geographic area.
126. See, e.g., Salco Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 1975 Trade Cas. 60,322 (10th Cir.
1975); Kaiser v. General Motors Corp., 1975 Trade Cas. 60,354 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
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"pass-over" clauses.'2 1 Such restrictions, though not as effective as
absolute territorial restraints, are alternate methods by which man-
ufacturers can somewhat control the point of sale operations of their
distributors and consequently increase their own efficiency. Courts
have been equally as reluctant to apply the rule where the passage
of title to goods is not directly involved, as in the licensing of trade-
marks, copyrights and patents'2 8 and the franchising of services.'2
The cases that have declined to read Schwinn as establishing an
across-the-board per se rule have not stood unopposed.'39 Several
courts have implied that lesser restraints upon intrabrand competi-
tion than those that appeared in Schwinn are still unreasonable per
se. Although the opinion in GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T. V.,
Inc. ,3, has been subsequently withdrawn pending a rehearing before
A location clause limits a dealer in that the manufacturer may discontinue dealing with
him if goods are sold from other than approved sales outlets. Such a provision was explicitly
approved by the trial court in Schwinn after remand from the Supreme Court. United States
v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. 291 F. Supp. 567 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
In GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 1974 Trade Cas. 75,072 (9th Cir. 1974),
petition for rehearing en banc granted and opinions withdrawn, 1974 Trade Cas. 75,435 (9th
Cir. 1974), a three judge panel headed by former Supreme Court Justice Clark declared a
television manufacturer's system of selling to only authorized locations of franchised dealers
to be a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). No case prior
to this decision had expanded the Schwinn rule to encompass less restrictive controls than
those actually present in Schwinn itself, and in light of the judicial tolerance afforded "area
of primary responsibility" clauses, "pass over" clauses, and "exclusive territories," the opin-
ion was somewhat of a maverick. On December 19, 1974, the Ninth Circuit granted the
defendant's motion for rehearing en banc and, in a somewhat unprecedented move, withdrew
the panel's opinion. For a well reasoned criticism of the short-sighted views of the short-lived
opinion see 88 HARV. L. REv. 636 (1975).
127. See, e.g., Superior Bedding Co. v. Serta Associates, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 1143 (N.D.
111. 1972). See also White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 270-71 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring). See generally Timberg, Territorial Restrictions on Franchisors, 19 ANTITRUST
BULL. 205, 207-08 (1974).
A "pass-over" clause requires a dealer to turn over part of the profit it makes on a sale
outside of its "area of primary responsibility" to the dealer responsible for the sales promotion
and servicing efforts in that territory. The use of such a provision is a direct attempt to deal
with the problem of "free riding." See text accompanying notes 90-92 supra.
128. See, e.g., Williams & Co. v. Williams & Co.-East, 377 F. Supp. 418 (C.D. Cal. 1974);
Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 375 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Selegson v. Plum Tree,
Inc., 361 F. Supp. 748 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
129. See, e.g., Anderson v. American Auto. Ass'n, 454 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1972); cf.
National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Milk Drivers Local 680, 308 F. Supp. 982 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
See also Polytechnic Data Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 362 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
130. See cases cited at note 95 supra.
131. 1974 Trade Cas. 75,072 (9th Cir. 1974), petition for rehearing en banc granted and
opinions withdrawn, 1974 Trade Cas. 75,435 (9th Cir. 1974).
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the Ninth Circuit en banc, the reasoning in that case somewhat
typifies the views of less enlightened enforcers of the antitrust laws.
Sylvania, a television manufacturer with a declining share of the
market, instituted a new marketing program wherein it limited the
number of dealers to which it would sell in any one area and pro-
hibited sales from other than approved retail outlets in an effort to
encourage its dealers to vigorously promote its brand. 32 Continen-
tal T.V., which owned eight franchised outlets in San Francisco,
began to sell Sylvania televisions from its new unapproved Sacra-
mento store. Sylvania, presumably feeling that it did not need
additional outlets in Sacramento, put pressure upon Continental
to discontinue sales from that location and finally cancelled all of
Continental's franchised stores. 33 The trial judgelm found that such
efforts to restrict sales to certain retail outlets were per se illegal, 35
and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The circuit court's opinion was
somewhat confusing because it stated that a manufacturer may still
choose dealers on the basis of their location, and may give a dealer
an exclusive franchise and promise not to franchise others in that
area,'3 6 but may not take steps to enforce these decisions without
conflicting with Schwinn's mandate.137
Another recent case, Reed Bros., Inc. v. Monsanto Co. ,'3 has also
confused the Schwinn doctrine, and again Justice Clark,'39 the
champion of unfettered intrabrand competition, has authored the
opinion. In this case, Monsanto, a manufacturer of herbicides, con-
tracted to sell to dealers who agreed to exert their best efforts within
designated "areas of primary responsibility.' '" 0 Reed Bros. was one
such Monsanto dealer who was "responsible" for a seven county
area in Iowa.'' In 1968, Monsanto dropped Reed as a distributor for
the reason that it had not adequately represented the manufacturer
132. 1974 Trade Cas. 75,072, at 96,793.
133. Id.
134. The trial judge was none other than retired Justice Clark sitting by designation.
135. John P. Maguire & Co. v. Continental T.V., Inc., Civil No. 44251 TCC (N.D. Cal.,
Feb. 16, 1971), aff'd sub nom. GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., 1974 Trade Cas.
75,072 (9th Cir.), petition for rehearing en banc granted and opinions withdrawn, 1974
Trade Cas. 75,435 (9th Cir. 1974).
136. 1974 Trade Cas. 75,072, at 96,794.
137. Id. at 96,795.
138. 1975.Trade Cas. 60,329 (8th Cir. 1975).
139. Again, retired Justice Clark was sitting by designation.
140. 1975 Trade Cas. 60,329, at 66,352.
141. Id.
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within its assigned territory.' Thereafter, Reed began to operate as
a "discounter" of Monsanto's products, buying from other distribu-
tors at a high-volume discount and selling to retailers or other
wholesalers over the telephone."' In 1969, Monsanto instituted a
new shipping policy which provided that dealers could accept orders
for prepaid delivery only for destinations within their areas of re-
sponsibility and that orders for pick-up of herbicides would be ac-
cepted only at Monsanto warehouses within the ordering distribu-
tor's assigned territory.' In addition, Monsanto instigated a rebate
program whereby distributors were given a per unit rebate for all
herbicides sold directly to retail dealers, allegedly for the purpose
of compensating those distributors who employed extra salesmen to
vigorously penetrate the dealer market. 45 The natural effect of these
policies was to make it economically burdensome for a distributor
to sell to anyone outside of his area of responsibility because of the
increased shipping costs and also to make it more expensive for
anyone except a retail dealer to buy from a distributor. Conse-
quently, Reed's wholesaling business declined considerably,"6 and
it brought suit against Monsanto for violations of § 1 of the Sherman
Act. 47
The court concluded that Monsanto's decision to drop Reed as
one of its distributors was justified by Reed's neglect of its area of
primary responsibility, but held that its post-termination activities
constituted Schwinn violations."' It is difficult to understand what
the Reed court was actually prohibiting by its decision since there
was evidence that Monsanto not only affected the distributors by
its shipping and rebate programs, but also coerced them into actual
compliance with the territorial restrictions by threats of termina-
tion.'49 The court did not restrict its condemnation to such patent
enforcement of territorial restrictions, however, but implied that
Monsanto's conduct which raised the cost of herbicides to Reed also
fell within the purview of Schwinn since it effectively eliminated
Reed from competing as a wholesaler.' 50
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 66,353.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 66,354.
147. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
148. 1975 Trade Cas. 60,329, at 66,356.
149. Id. at 66,357-59.
150. Id. at 66,359.
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Looking at the Sylvania and Reed cases in contrast to the more
enlightened post-Schwinn case law, it is clear that Schwinn has
done little to aid the judiciary in understanding and enforcing the
antitrust laws. Confusion still abounds. The Supreme Court may
have decided in Schwinn that the elimination of all intrabrand com-
petition is to be considered illegal per se because it outweighs any
benefits from increased interbrand competition, 5 ' or it may have
merely decided that the complete restraint upon alienation is too
extreme a restriction to achieve desired marketing controls when
less restrictive methods are possible. Whatever premise the Su-
preme Court relied upon, it is clear that cases such as Sylvania and
Reed go beyond the dictates of Schwinn to ban any restraints that
adversely affect intrabrand competition.
In Sylvania, the location clauses imposed by the manufacturer
definitely decreased intrabrand competition to some degree because
a retailer's sale potential is limited by the geographic draw of his
approved sales outlet, i.e., a retailer could only effectively compete
within an area reasonably proximate to his franchised store. Compe-
tition still exists on the retail level, however, since the placement
of outlets does not prohibit any dealer from selling to any customer
who wishes to travel to his store. In addition, it is unlikely that a
manufacturer could promote such vigorous sales efforts by its dis-
tributors without being able to enforce its promises to lessen intra-
brand competition by limiting the number of dealer outlets. In
Reed, Monsanto's policy of giving rebates to distributors who sold
directly to retailers made it more costly for a wholesaler to stay in
business, but the effect was certainly not the elimination of all
intrabrand competition.'52
Both of these cases seem to imply that it is per se illegal to restrict
any form of intrabrand competition other than by unilateral deci-
sions not to sell to a particular dealer. Schwinn may have declared
that the complete elimination of all intrabrand competition is an
unreasonable restraint of trade, no matter what the effect on inter-
151. See Zimmerman, Distribution Restrictions After Sealy And Schwinn, 12 ANTITRUST
BULL. 1181, 1184 (1967).
152. It should be noted here that the court would have been justified to find that Mon-
santo had violated Schwinn by actual enforcement of its territorial restrictions or that Mon-
santo's restraints were unreasonable because they had been instituted merely to eliminate
Reed as a wholesaler. The findings of the court went beyond these two conclusions, however,
and implied that the ancillary elimination of a wholesaler as a result of a manufacturer's
business policies renders such conduct illegal without any inquiry into its reasonableness.
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brand competition, but it never purported to declare where the
balance might be struck between increased interbrand competition
and a mere lessening of intrabrand competition. For this reason,
Schwinn is not authority for declaring the latter situation per se
illegal, and in light of the questionable basis for abandoning the
"rule of reason" even where intrabrand competition is completely
eliminated, the courts should refrain from meddling into the busi-
ness decisions of manufacturers where there is no further reason to
do so.
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